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Abstract
Regulatory tendencies in the European Union have been increasing since the crisis of 07/08. The
regulator has imposed a new set of prudential rules to increase the stability of financial markets; one
of the focuses was the transparency of costs and fees for customers regulated through Mifid I and II.
However, most of these regulations have not had any impact on the third pillar of pension systems – such
as voluntary personal pension funds. They are currently regulated mostly by national directives but the
EU wide regulators will centralize regulation and introduce a Pan European Personal Pension Product
(PEPP) in the coming months.
In the light of modern demographic developments, such as raising life expectancy, lower birth rates
and the generation of baby boomers to retire soon, the dependency ratio is rising and will most likely
continue to rise. Without additional funding sources and a shift in the political narrative, the future of
state funded pensions (at a sufficient level) is uncertain and at risk. Assets as a percentage of the GDP in
the second and third pension pillar are rising and younger generations are looking for alternative sources
for their future pensions.
Saving money might not be enough to preserve purchasing power (namely, if the inflation rate is higher
than the interest rate). In this thesis I discuss based on proxies from which risk level onwards (based
on the regulator’s classification), investments are able to overcome the inflation threshold on average. I
come to the conclusion that this threshold is category 4 based on the Synthetic Risk and Reward Indicator
(SRRI) risk categorization, which is broadly used by the regulator. Summarizing, investments in lower
categories might not be beneficial for investors. As the PEPP is supposed to have a default option, the
risk category of this option will have a huge impact on the financial well-being of future generations once
they retire if they choose this investment vehicle.
1 Introduction
In finance, the positive correlation between risk and reward is well known. A riskier financial product can
establish higher returns, however, the higher the volatility, which is mostly used for measuring risk, the
higher the downward risk, thereby, increasing the magnitude of potential losses. In economics, individual
and aggregate saving rates are a prominent topic. Individuals tend to save a part of their income for future
consumption. In order to preserve the purchasing power of capital or even increase it, savings should be
invested at a rate that is above inflation. Based on risk preferences, investors will choose a set of financial
assets in order to maximize their utilities. In this thesis, I discuss the risk and reward profile of personal
pension funds. In particular, I assess the minimum risk category for the preservation of the purchasing
power of investments. Empirical studies on personal pension funds are still very limited, mostly because
of lacking data. This circumstance makes it partly impossible to draw conclusions on the performance
of these financial products in the European Union. The European Insurance and Occupational Pension
Authority is currently in the process of gathering sufficient data for a European Union wide database.
As the data is not available yet, I use proxies based on exchange traded funds listed at Euronext to reach
a conclusion.
Life expectancy has been increasing in the last decades but the statutory retirement age (which
significantly differs from the actual retirement age) remains more or less stable (EC, 2018), with the
exception of some reforms. Politicians are reluctant to increase the age thresholds not only to keep their
popularity but also, as older workers often struggle to find employment and individuals show a decrease
in productivity from 65 onwards (Lazear, 1979; Duncan, 2001). As a result the dependency ratio of
economies is increasing; together with increases in social and health expenses this is posing a challenging
environment for the social state. In addition, the valuations used for pension system are questioned in
science, which makes it even harder to assess the sustainability of current pension systems. Plamondon,
Drouin, Binet, Cichon, McGillivray, Bédard and Pérez-Montas (2002) argue that the models used are
calibrated to small occupational pension funds and are not able to account for the vast uncertainties
that determine the amount of money, which will be needed in the future. Accurate assessment needs
a new stochastic approach. Furthermore, improvements in the governance are needed to account for a
broader population and ensure that specific groups are not marginalized and do not suffer from systematic
disadvantages (Plamondon, Drouin, Binet, Cichon, McGillivray, Bédard and Pérez-Montas, 2002).
The pension systems between members of the European Union member states differ in a substantial
manner and it is far beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss each and every of them1. Therefore, I
discuss the Portuguese pension system in particular and one can also see commonalities between the
individual systems in the European Union as they are based on a three pillars, with a mandatory first
1An extensive overview of the current pension systems in the member states of the European Union can be found in the
EC (2018) and Poteraj (2008).
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pillar, which is publicly managed, mandatory second pillar and voluntary third pillar.
The dominance of a certain pillar in a country is dependent on many factors, such as the institutional
framework, the economic situation and the level of financial literacy among the population. In the case
of Portugal the recent financial crisis is also an important factor as the economy was severely hit by the
financial shock and following reformed its social system to cover occurred losses. At the same time a
well funded pension system is necessary to ensure the economic well being of older generations once they
retire as the economic shock led to an increase in unemployment (decrease pension contributions and also
the ability of employed individuals to support members of their families which are unable to work).
I focus on the third pillar of pension systems and discuss the financial performance of personal pension
funds in relation to their risk profile. The importance of the private pillar is growing as demographic
changes make it less likely for governments to be able to guarantee a sufficient first pillar retirement
income under the current institutionalized system and economic narrative without any substantial tax
reforms. It remains to mention that the importance of the third pillar could also be reduced if states
were able to introduce a more reliable first pillar that is able to sustain despite economic and financial
shocks occurring by finding additional source of financing.
Depending on the phase of the economic cycle and the monetary and fiscal policy of the state, overnight
deposits might loose purchasing power if the interest rate is lower than inflation. Compounding interest
is often described as one of the most powerful financial concepts, where it makes a huge difference if
the average rate of return is for example 2% or 3% over the course of 40 years. Especially investments
in pension funds done by young people are therefore very meaningful and will determine the financial
well-being of these individuals during retirement years highly.
In this work I discuss the risk category of funds, according to the European classification based on the
Synthetic Risk and Reward Indicator (SRRI), that investors on average have to choose in order to at least
preserve their capital until reaching the retirement age. Risk preferences are a powerful microeconomic
concept and are often used to explain investment and consumption decisions. They are also prominent in
financial optimization and portfolio theories but are often seen as an exogenous factor. This work does
take a different approach as I do not want to endogenize risk preferences but assess which risk level is
needed to not loose purchasing power. As I show in the recent years investors had to invest in equity funds
or funds with an overweight in equities to achieve a desired level or returns. I combine these insights with
a broad theoretical framework, discussing the effects of financial literacy on investments and savings, the
regulatory environment of pension funds, the new proposal of a Pan European Personal Pension Product
issued to the European Commission and finally the performance of (pension) funds compared to their
benchmarks and exchange traded funds.
The Pan European Pension Product is supposed to be designed with limited choices and default
options and choosing the default option is very important as investors with limited financial knowledge
or mal informed investors will most likely not deviate from the default option. Summarizing, in this
thesis I discuss the returns of the proxies I build for European personal pension funds and conclude from
which risk category onwards the funds are profitable for their investors. I cross check my results with the
2
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Portuguese personal pension funds.
In the next chapter I review the above mentioned theoretical context, giving an overview of the status
quo, discuss demographic trends and risk preferences. In the next chapter I highlight the importance
of personal pension funds, point to their regulatory framework and summarize a number of studies on
performances of personal pension funds. The regulatory environment also contains EIOPA’s proposal
for an EU single market for personal pension plans. Next, I move on to describing the methodology
adopted in this thesis, reviewing different concepts of risk classifications and benchmarking and a brief
data description. The second last chapter presents the results and I end with a conclusion.
3
2 Theoretical Context
In the 1960s the Lifecycle Hypothesis was first described by Franco Modigliani. According to it saving and
consumption decisions made by individuals are based on their expectations of resources over their lifetime.
This means that consumption decisions depend on variables such as current income, expectations about
future income and future consumption. The theory can be extended by bequests and other variables and
is dependent on the discount rate of individuals and their preferences for future consumption. A positive
correlation between consumption in time t and the discount rate of economic agents can be observed since
the a high discount rate indicates that present consumption is valued higher than future consumption
and therefore economics agents will save less of their income. Following, the consumption is not stable
but adapts to different life stages to enable individuals to save capital when they earn labor income,
which can then be used for future consumption when their income stream declines. The expectations
about future income and the propensity to save are highly dependent on the expected length of the work
and retirement period; the longer the expected period without income (or small income) – the retirement
period – the higher the propensity to save (Modigliani, 1966).
The theory can be seen as a baseline scenario that offers important insights into saving decisions and
consumption patterns. Additionally, it provides intuition for the economy as a whole because it is able
to derive important macroeconomic variables such as the savings rate, aggregate demand and the output
of an economy.
In this framework, individuals are assumed to be rational enough to assess achieve the consumption
smoothing effect and also earn enough money to be able to set a substantial portion of their income apart
for future consumption but one of the reasons for economies is poverty relief, therefore, suggesting that
some individuals are dependent on the State for achieving a minimum threshold of consumption. Other
reasons for developing a state pension system include the insurance against social risk or redistribution
goals (Barr and Diamond, 2009).
In 1994 the World Bank has defined the well-known Three Pillar Pension system and issued a rec-
ommendation for economies to implement it in order to counterfeit demographic developments such as
rising life expectancy and declining fertility rates paired with the decline in traditional support systems,
e.g. families (The World Bank, 1994). An additional benefit is the full risk diversification among public
and private management of pensions. The Worldbank’s classification system is present in a great number
of economies today2.
2In the last 30 years, the proposal has also been criticized and also revised by the Worldbank itself. The Worldbank
has acknowledged the plurality in pension systems worldwide, the revised recommendation consists of five pillars: which
are: a non-contributory “zero pillar” for a social pension, a mandatory “first pillar”, a mandatory “second” pillar, a
voluntary “third pillar”, which all correspond to the pillars from the original proposal and a non-financial “fourth pillar”,
which includes informal support from families, non-monetary support from the state or non-financial assets accumulated
by individuals (World Bank, 2008). The more flexible system is supposed to counterfeit poverty among elders in a more
efficient way.
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The pillars are classified as following3:
1. Publicly managed savings with mandatory participation: the main objective is alleviating age
poverty and co-insuring against income risks, low investment returns and economic factors, such as
inflation or private market failures through the redistribution of income between different income
cohorts.
2. Privately managed savings with mandatory or voluntary participation: link benefits actuarially to
costs of the income smoothing over lifetime process. In addition, this pillar is able to boost the
development of financial markets and capital accumulation in economies, where these markets are
under developed.
3. Voluntary savings: provide additional protection for people who want a higher pension income or
additional insurance. Personal pension plans are part of this pillar.
According to The World Bank (1994) the involvement of governments is necessary because individuals
often suffer from short-sightedness, are confronted with inadequate savings instruments, suffer from long-
term poverty or from financial illiteracy and the private sector can or does not account for these risks. In
order to counterfeit severe poverty among older age cohorts and parts of populations which are unable
to work, a state funded pension pillar is necessary.
One can differentiate between three main financing and managerial arrangements.
1. Public pay-as-you-go offers: income redistribution systems that define benefits as not actuarially
tied to contributions and which are usually financed through taxes from the working population.
2. Occupational plans: privately managed plans which often hold tax advantages. These arrangement
have experienced a shift from defined benefit to defined contribution in recent years.
3. Personal savings and annuity plans: fully funded defined contribution plans, which are also often
encouraged by tax incentives.
Pension systems benefit from a multi-pillar system because of several reasons. One of them is that
systems with a dominant public pillar might not guarantee a sufficient level of redistribution, saving and
insurance as it is prone to the lack of efficiency and distribution failures as high levels of taxes might
be needed paid by wealthier cohorts, which can serve as an incentive for tax evasion (The World Bank,
1994). Also, a one pillar system can lead to deadweight losses and negative effects on the growth level
of economic. Furthermore, it fails to foster the development of capital markets. Economic growth might
be hindered if the private sector does not have access to pension assets because they are only managed
by the government as the money could be invested in capital markets instead (The World Bank, 1994).
However, this can be contested as savings are not automatically invested, the assumption that savings
equal investments is too simplified (Ghilarducci, 1995). Some commercial banks in Europe decided to
pass on negative interest rates charged by the ECB to their customers but deposits accounts are still filled
3A graphical overview of the proposal can be found in first appendix.
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with idle money. A system relying solely on occupational plans is not able to redistribute income from a
social perspective and might be subject to employer or insurance company default. Privately managed
personal saving plans do not take financial illiteracy or long term poverty into account and accelerate
inequalities that result from differences in labor incomes and unequal starting positions in life between
individuals. Lastly, lower income classes might not be able to save a portion of their income as all of it
is used for current consumption to satisfy basic needs (The World Bank, 1994).
The need for a well funded pension system depends to a considerable amount on the ability of the
population to save for their retirement individually. If the saving rate is high in a country and the
population invests in financial products or other investment vehicles, such as property, precious metals
or art, most people will be able to achieve a consumption smoothing effect without dedicated retirement
savings, as they can liquidate their other investments once the retirement age has been reached, although
this argument is somehow oversimplified as we have to account for individual cases, where economic agents
become dependent before reaching their retirement age, financial shocks and other peculiar circumstances.
However, this is not the case in most countries and for a vast majority of people. In addition, the
pension system as a whole is highly important for the redistribution of wealth and a number of theoretical
concepts influence it to a great extent. From an economic point of view the micro and the macro level
are relevant, on the individual basis consumption and investment decisions are made based on it. From a
macro perspective, pension systems can be see as important investors and can have a significant impact
on the growth rate of an economy. Fully funded pension systems need to invest the capital, therefore,
these plans can foster the development of specific sectors.
The implementation and enforcement of a multi pillar system has been also criticized as it takes
responsibility away from the states. The privatization of the system creates new challenges for individuals,
especially for lower income classes and for labour unions to develop international standards for pension
investments (Ghilarducci, 1995). In addition, Ghilarducci (1995) criticizes that a decentralized pension
system looses the insurance aspect as workers are self-responsible to work long enough to contribute
sufficiently and are exposed to the risk of low returns and that
“[t]he 1994 World Bank report on international pensions applauds efforts to transform the
global pension fund management framework into the Anglo-Saxon model of finance markets
embracing MPT [modern portfolio theory] - which is unrestrictive.” (Ghilarducci, 1995, 64)
2.1 The Pension System in Portugal
The statutory retirement age in Portugal in 2008 was 65 for men and women, whereas, the effective exit
age in 2007 was 62.9 for males and 62.3 for females, which is higher than the European comparison,
especially for women. The lowest has been observed in France with 59.5 for males and 59.4 for females
with a statutory age of 60 (EC, 2009). The average life expectancy is 82, which means that on average,
people receive pension income for almost 20 years (OECD, 2016).
Since the financial crisis in 2007/08, the European Union and individual member states have been
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pushing for structural changes. Scholars argue that these reforms have led to the increase of inequality
and general austerity measures. Hermann (2017) gives an overview of the structural reforms that have
been adopted in many member states. The author shows that pension systems have been affected by seven
specific proceedings in a number of countries, such as the increase of the retirement age, the reduction
of pension payments, temporary pension freezes, the extension of contribution periods, the extension
of periods on which pension payments are calculated, the limitation of access to early and invalidity
pensions and automatic adjustments to life expectancy. Portugal suffered from a temporary pension
freeze, limitations of access to early and invalidity pensions and reductions in pension payments, e.g. the
elimination of the 13th and 14th pension payments putting more pressure on the second and third pillar
of the pension system.
The pension system in Portugal has undergone several reforms in recent decades in order to improve
its capability of consumption smoothing throughout the lifetime of individuals and provide an appropriate
level of retirement income for the country’s inhabitants.
The first pension scheme was established in 1929 and secured retirement income for public sector
employees, in 1935 a plan for the private sector followed. These pension plans were fully-funded and have
been changed to pay-as-you-go funds in 1962 when the previous system failed to provide an adequate
income for retirees. In the 1980s the second and third pillar were introduced in the country and 19 years
later the alignment of these three pillars began.
The first pillar was subject to several cuts due to the financial crisis of 07/08 and following the
importance of the second and third pillar increased. However, one needs to consider that the importance
of the second and third pillar also suffered from the financial crisis, since the financial well-being of the
Portuguese population suffered generally on average. Therefore, individuals often had to cut consumption
and also saving rate, where parts could have gone to the third pillar. Furthermore, unemployment rose,
leading to a decrease of contributions to the second pillar. According to the original idea, the first pillar
should satisfy basic needs and is labor-market based (mandatory for private and public sector employees);
additional retirement income should be covered by pensions from occupational (voluntary) and private
pension plans (voluntary and often paired with tax benefits) and individual saving accounts.
Occupational pension funds are managed by 22 institutions and consisted of 224 different pension funds
in 2013, 90% of the assets under management were allocated to closed funds in 2009 and the majority of
pension plans are defined benefit but the trend is displaying a shift towards defined contributions (Garcia,
2017).
In Portugal 21.8% of people aged 65+ are at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion and the relative poverty
gap for the same age cohort was 18% in 2016 (EC, 2018).
2.2 The Demographic Framework
The 21st century is marked by a number of severe institutional challenges that are materializing worldwide.
Not only will we have to find a solution for the depletion of natural resources, the climate change, the
7
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raising inequality and unequal distribution of resources but also, transform our pension systems and labor
markets, especially in European countries, to meet challenges such as an ageing population and recent
and future technological revolutions.
As population ages and life expectancy rises, the costs for social security rise, pension and health
care expenditures are accelerating in many countries. Politicians and scholars have been questioning
the sustainability of existing systems for years and decades and many European countries are imposing
reforms in their pension systems, as has been discussed with regards to Portugal in the previous section.
Although, the demographic changes were present for decades almost no additional funding for the pension
systems has been put aside to ensure its sustainability.
The exogenous developments, such as demographic changes paired with endogenous increases in fund-
ing gaps in many economies, led to worldwide macroeconomic challenges. According to Bloom et al. (2015)
one can differentiate between four major groups:
1. Older people work less than young and middle aged people on average. This leads to a lower output
per person ratio in countries with a larger proportion of older population.
2. Consumption tends to be a higher percentage of income for older people and average savings tend
to fall throughout the life cycle, which can lead to lower investments.
3. An increased cohort of retired people affects public and private pension schemes. As a lower share
of the population is contributing to the systems and a larger share is receiving pensions.
4. Older people tend to burden the national expenditures by higher cost for health care based on
diseases and disabilities as the longevity increases.
The current demographic environments do not only have downsides. A larger cohort of retirees might
boost consumption, especially for age related consumption goods, for example, medical goods. As the
dependency ratio and social expenditure for health care increase, a pay as you go system becomes more
and more unsustainable, the financing sources need to be diversified. Opinions differ on the question
if the pension system is facing an economic problem or a political one. The pension system does not
necessarily have to be self-sufficient. The idea of a social system is to redistribute among the population
and the redistribution does not have to be limited to employees and pensioneers only. The state can
spend more than current pension contributions on current pensions as long as they find a way to finance
the additional burden in a sustainable way.
Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov (2008) also show that the speed of ageing is likely to increase in the
next decades and will start decelerating by 2050. In Western Europe the average age is projected to raise
from 38.3 in 2000 to 53.5 in 2100 and Eastern Europe is exhibiting a similar increase from 37 to 52.4.
The same holds for the median age, which according to the authors, will increase from 36.8 to 56.5 and
35.6 to 55.7 in the same time period in Western and Eastern Europe. The proportion of the population
over 60 years more than doubles in both regions from 0.20 to 0.46 and 0.18 to 0.44, respectively. The
probability in Western Europe for a age distribution, where over 1/3 of the population is 60+, is 82%
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within this century. According to the estimations of the authors, the prospective median age will increase
from 36.8 in 2000 to 41.3 in 2050 and decrease back to 37.7 in 2100 in Western Europe. The share of the
population, with a remaining life expectancy of less than 15 years will change from 0.13 to 0.19 in 2050
and 2100. Thereby, indicating a stabilization and slowdown in population ageing. Lastly, the average
remaining years decrease from 41 in 2000 to 39.7 in 2050 and reverting to 43.5 in 2100 in Western Europe.
In countries of the Global North, population ageing is the dominant trend, where the most challenging
times are yet to come before a slow down can be expected, as forecasts show that the dependency ratio
will almost double by 2050. The older cohort typically will hold a larger share in assets, which will
increase the productivity of labor and wages but lead to a decline in the return on capital in a closed
economy. In an open economy the effect will be different, as capital will be invested abroad once the
return on capital starts declining. A decline in capital or labor productivity might then lead to a decrease
in economic growth (Lee and Mason, 2011).
The above mentioned projections clearly highlight the current and upcoming challenges for most
pensions systems. The dependency ratio keeps raising and will almost double in some countries once
the generation of the so-called baby boomers will stop working and retire. Without any reforms, such
as substantial tax reforms and re-distributional fiscal policy, European countries might not be able to
support such a big proportion of an older population and the third pension pillar might then gain more
and more importance in the next years when it comes to providing a minimum retirement income.
The dependency ratio describes the proportion of the non-working population to the working popu-
lation – the number of children and of retired people divided by the non-retired number times 100. In
all countries we are expecting this ratio to grow, as life expectancy rises and fertility rates decreases –
the portion of dependent individuals increases while the working population grows slower or decreases.
In some countries the ratio was very low and is not projected to grow strongly. The Netherlands had a
ratio of 28% in 2007 and the projection shows 42% in 2060. On the other extreme is Lithuania with 63%
in 2007 already and expected 123% in 2060. One can see that the increase between 2007 and 2060 lies
between 12 percentage points and 61, with an average of 39 percentage points. This is clearly a significant
acceleration in all countries of the Euro zone. The dependency ratio will grow stronger in less developed
European countries. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that young people in these countries
are currently going abroad to neighbour countries to earn more during their work life but are expected
to return to their home country for their retirement period, as future generations might continue doing
this, the proportion of retirees will exceed the proportion of workers very quickly.
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Figure 2.1: Development of the Dependency Ratio in the Euro zone
Data retrieved from EC (2009)
However, it is not only the first pillar that might suffer from the mentioned projections, all three
pension pillars will be facing new challenges without substantial reforms and new funding sources. States
will suffer from the increasing burden of the social state and financial markets might suffer from a huge
sell movement on the financial markets. The Asset Market Meltdown Hypothesis argues that there is a
strong link between financial assets and the age structure of the population. Based on the sizes of the age
cohorts supply of financial assets might exceed demand substantially, leading to decreasing asset prices
and thereby reducing returns on investments for sellers of financial products (Poterba, 2001).
Theoretical models tend to establish and calibrate a very strong relationship between the age compo-
sition of market participants and the return on or price level of financial assets based on the Asset Market
Meltdown and Lifecycle Hypothesis. A simple plot of the ratio of 40 – 64 years old to total population and
leading stock indices displays a strong correlation and gives strong reasoning for further research. One
of the simplest baseline models was established by Poterba (2001). Based on a two period overlapping
generation model, with a fixed amount of capital, savings rate and income, the author concludes that
generational cohorts, which are big will have to buy assets at a higher price while they are working and
sell at a lower price if the next cohort is smaller as the price will drop due to the increased supply of
financial assets when the large cohort retirees. The limitations and shortcomings of this model have
been broadly discussed in academia as the assumptions are very simplified and do not take international
capital flows or governmental policies into account. Future developments remain uncertain and the model
does not account for changes in other factors that influence investments, investments are not liquidated
automatically to be used for consumption (Brooks, 2006) and can serve as bequests (Abel, 2001). Also,
under the assumption of rationality and symmetric information to a certain degree, investors are aware
of the future decline in asset prices and therefore, this should already be reflected in present values of
financial assets, thereby, not leading to a financial meltdown (Schich, 2009).
Summarizing, it might be the case that not only the increased dependency ratio but also lower financial
markets returns on average will lead to a highly challenging environment for pension systems, especially
10
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in the Global North.
Inequality in income and wealth is raising worldwide, which implies that richer people are becoming
richer and poorer people even poorer; the gap between different cohorts is widening. The economic
idea is that individuals save during the time that they are employed in order to guarantee and secure
consumption for the time when they are retired. However, if they do not have the means to finance
current consumption they will also not be able to save for future consumption and will in addition not
receive any capital gains. As the future of state pension systems is unclear and governments are trying to
make individuals more self-responsible and encourage them to increase their savings for a private pension,
the increase in inequality will disable some individuals to secure this future source of consumption.
Skopek, Buchholy and Blossfeld (2011) find that the wealth distribution in European countries is
highly right skewed, even more than the income distribution. Based on their sample of 13 EU member
states, they conclude that the bottom 20% of the sample distribution have between -1% and 1% of the
wealth of the country, where most countries show a value of 0%. In contrast the value for the top 5% of
the distribution range from 21% to 53% (in Poland) of the total wealth.
In addition, the net worth Gini Coefficient shows values from 0.51 (in Belgium) up to 0.75 (in Poland)
indicating a higher overall level than the net income Gini Coefficient for all countries from the sample
(Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka and Tsounta, 2015).
One important distinction to be made is between the inequality of outcomes and opportunities. The
inequality of outcomes can be quantified by measures such as the Gini Coefficient, whereas, the inequality
of opportunities describes differences based on unchangeable factors, such as discriminatory factors, e.g.
ethnicity, gender, religion. This separation is useful to understand how inequalities arise, however, both
types are strongly linked to each other. Based on Rawls (2009) definition of justice, one can say on one
hand that inequality in opportunities is unjust and should therefore not exist in a democratic and fair
society. On the other hand the author acknowledges that both types of inequalities exist as the principles
of justice are not flawless and must rely on fairness since:
“[n]o society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal
sense; each person finds himself places at birth in some particular position in some particular
society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects” (Rawls, 2009, 12).
John Rawls also correctly points out that one type can lead to another, specifically that inequality of
opportunities leads (in many cases) to inequality of outcomes. The set of possible outcomes is restricted
through the minimized set of opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to understand that the social order
we have established in not just as per Rawls’ definition and different realities are partly even grounded
and justified by our social order.
The above argument can be better understood through an example. Let us assume that we have to
equal individuals but one of them is so-called financial literate because his or her parents taught him
or her everything they knew on this subject and the other is not. If both of them receive a certain
amount to invest, the odds are high that the person with financial knowledge will achieve a better return
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on his or her investment (assuming that financial returns do not follow a random walk). Although one
would assume that the individuals are able to achieve equality in outcomes, as they do not differ in other
cognitive abilities, risk preferences or any other factor, one of them is advantaged because he or she been
taught the basic principles of investing. This difference in opportunities leads to a difference in outcomes
for the mentioned individuals.
The individual level of financial knowledge has important implications for welfare. Neoclassical mi-
croeconomic approaches assume a well-informed (fully informed), rational investor, who determines his
or her savings and consumption ratio based on risk preferences and the discount rate. However, there is a
huge literature, which shows that assuming rationality does not necessary reflect real life circumstances4.
The level of financial knowledge also differs greatly based on factors such as gender or age, where white,
middle-aged, college-educated men seem to have the best financial knowledge (Lusardi and Mitchell,
2014).
Empirical results of studies on financial literacy are shocking, not only a huge lack of understanding
basic financial concepts has been detected but also most individuals tend to overestimated their knowledge
and therefore to not seek professional financial advise according to the results. Lusardi and Mitchell
(2014) identify three main concepts, which have to be understood by individual investors in order for
them to decide rationally on their investments: the numeracy and capacity to do calculations related to
interest rates, understanding inflation, and understanding risk diversification. The researchers show that
on average less than 50% of the research subjects were able to answer simple questions regarding financial
knowledge, proving that the mentioned concepts are not preliminary knowledge.
An increase in the overall level of financial literacy can benefit all market participants through in-
creasing consumer welfare, increasing demand for financial products in the financial services industry,
decreasing regulatory burdens for policy makers and increasing economic stability for the economy as a
whole (Yoong, 2011).
Summarizing, one can see that the future of pension system in the European Union (and worldwide)
is uncertain. Demographic changes urge economies to reform their systems but instead of trying to foster
equality and decrease inequality among populations, the reforms often lead to an increase in differences
in financial income and wealth between different groups. If the assumption is right that in a few years
the financial sector will be facing a huge decline in financial asset prices, states will have to step in and
provide a bare minimum of pension income for their citizens as private pension schemes will suffer from
major losses and will not be able to provide for their investors. Lacks of financial literacy lead investors
and savers to make non-optimal decisions and not make use of financial concepts such as compounding
interest, thereby, even promoting inequality as only a few have access and can make use of financial
markets.
The importance of a good governance of private pension funds is even higher as this could be a financial
instrument that enables the broad mass of people to gain access to financial markets through well managed
4The results of game theoretical experiments with individuals often show that choices are not as rational as mainstream
economic theory assumes. Examples of this can be found in Colman (2003), Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) and Gintis (2000).
Also, a full discussion of the assumption of rationality and its shortcomings can be found in Ziolkowski (2017).
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and optimally allocated and diversified assets. Unfortunately, pension funds are often criticized for low
returns and high management fees, which makes the benefit of using them as an investment vehicle
questionable, especially compared to low cost alternatives (Gökçen and Yalçın, 2015). In addition, fees
are negatively correlated with the total amount of assets as a very wealthy investor will pay a lower fee
because of economies of scale as fees are sometimes also charged in a nominal amount or to a certain
threshold on a percentage basis. Asset and portfolio managers might have an incentive to offer discounts
on management fees for wealthier people in order to adhere their wealth to the fund.
2.3 Risk Preferences
Institutions and states recommend people to save for their retirement, however, most of them do not have
a sufficient level of financial literacy for rational decision making and investments or savings end up locked
up in low return saving or investment accounts, making people actually worse off as their money has a
higher purchasing power at the time of saving than it will in the future (OECD, n.d.). When individuals
decide to invest in pension plans, occupational or personal, they often face a lack of accountability from
the fund managers and most of the achieved investment returns are used to pay management fees. In
recent years, the European Union was confronted with a low interest rate environment, making less risky
investment returns even lower, thereby, forcing many investors to overweight stocks in their portfolios but
pension plans have specific asset allocations they have to stick to and early withdrawals are very often
punished or even impossible. Even if assuming that pension plan investors on average have a sufficient
level of financial knowledge to observe that their asset allocation needs to be adopted to the business cycle
phase, which we are currently facing, it still might be impossible or hurtful for them to act accordingly
and change their investment strategy due to the institutional framework of pension plans.
In 2007/08 the worldwide economy, especially the US was hit by a severe financial shock, followed by
spill over effects to Europe and the emergence of domestic sovereign debt crises. We have experienced
a major recession followed by a depression. The European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve tried
to counterfeit the economic downturn with cheap money, lowering the interest rates and even opting for
unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing.
Returns of stocks and bonds are negatively correlated and since interest payments have been lowered
as a response to the economic turmoil the stock markets have experienced a few highs. The below two
graphs show that in many moments government bonds and stock indices are negatively correlated and
experience adverse developments on the markets. Especially the German and the Portuguese data seem
to be displaying this pattern, as can be seen in figure 2.2. The European data in figure 2.3 looks less sound
because it contains more averaged values and many different factors play an important role. In addition,
the importance of a diversified portfolio becomes visible through these graphs. Investors typically want to
achieve a substantial return by minimizing volatility, which can be achieved be investments in negatively
correlated assets.
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Figure 2.2: PSI 20 and DAX and Indexed Portuguese and German 10y Government Bonds
Data retrieved from Bloomberg
Figure 2.3: Eurostoxx 50 and EONIA returns
Data retrieved from Bloomberg
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In financial theory the time horizon of investments is a significant variable. For pension savings, young
investors will typically hold their assets for a longer time period than somebody who is planning to retire
in the next few years. If the time horizon is large, investors can choose financial products with a higher
volatility as they can wait for recessions and financial downturns to pass before liquidating the assets.
Mainstream economic and finance theories very often assume rationality and symmetric information, in
the sense that individuals are able to correctly incorporate their knowledge in their financial decisions.
Therefore, it is also assumed that the risk preferences of investors gradually decline as individuals become
older (Mcleish, 1982; Brown, 1990; P̊alsson, 1996); equities should therefore be over represented in young
people’s choices, whereas fixed income should be under represented and vice versa for older investors. As
I will show in this section most investors are not rational in this sense and factors such as gender and
knowledge have a remarkable impact on risk preferences.
Studies on the gender pay gap often try to explain their outcomes by risk preferences as well, as
women tend to take less risk in their professional lives and therefore often do not get promoted or are
not responsible for major projects (Bowles and McGinn, 2008). Differences in incomes translate then to
the gender pension gap and different saving and investment rates. The average gender pay gap in the
European Union in 2012 was 38.3% (taking the male pension income as a base), it ranged from 4.8% in
Estonia to 44.7% in Germany, in Portugal the gap was 31.1% (EC, 2018). The differences are huge and
as women earn less on average, they also have lower savings and are often less able to additionally save
money for the retirement years. Following, one can assume that they have on average lower incomes from
all three pillars than men.
Risk preferences also directly influence savings and pensions as they are highly relevant for investment
decisions. Economics differentiates between risk averse, risk neutral and risk loving individuals. According
to the financial theory, investors decide based on their preferences how much risk they are willing to take
and Optimal Portfolio Theory suggests that once the risk level is determined the portfolio can be optimized
subject to the risk constraint (Markowitz, 1952). Following, what matters to investors is the Sharpe ratio
and not the absolute or relative performance of their investments.
From our personal experience we know that most people do not base their saving decisions on the
Sharpe Ratio or the state of the economic environment. The research question I pose in this thesis concerns
wealth preservation, so relative performance is the most important indicator for this but people often
only take absolute performance into account (and ignore important determinants of the performance,
such as inflation). There is a strong correlation between performance and risk, the riskier a product is,
the higher the volatility and the higher (lower) the performance can be.
Many researchers have determined two factors that influence risk preferences for investments, the first
one is financial literacy and the second is gender. However, these two factors are reciprocal as women
tend to have a lower level of financial knowledge on average.
Dwyer, Gilkeson and List (2002) find in a national survey in the US of mutual fund investors that
there is a large gender gap in risk taking, which is halved if their regression controls for financial literacy.
According to the authors wealthier, more educated investors tend to take on a higher risk level on average.
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Gender differences in risk taking behaviour have been observed, which does not mean that there is a
natural difference (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). The question between nature and nature regarding gender
differences in general is still controversial and I do not aim to answer it here5 but one must take into
account that if risk taking is rewarded in investment decisions, or if a high level of risk preferences are
needed to preserve invested capital, women will have on average lower rate of returns on their investments
than men. Experiments that prove this point have been conducted by Bönte (2015), who shows that
women are less competitive on average or Cronson and Buchan (1999), who show that women are more
generous on average and might therefore, have a lower tendency to save for their retirement period.
Next to gender, age and parental background also play a significant role in explaining differences in
risk attitudes (Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner, 2011).
5Feminist theory and gender theory can be divided in three schools of thought: Egalitarian feminism, Differential
feminism and Post-structuralism. Nowadays Differential feminism has been mostly rejected as it argues that there are
natural differences between sexes. Egalitarian feminism and Poststructuralism, which are the contemporary mainstream do
not acknowledge natural distinctions between men and women, where the latter does not even accept the rigid categories
of men and women. (Becker and Kortendiek, 2010).
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3 Personal Pension Funds
Personal pension funds are fully funded defined contributions plans, where savings are deposited in
a personal account and become available once the retirement age of the investor is reached. They
are voluntary and independent of the employer and contributors can choose the investment manager
themselves as opposed to occupational pension funds, where the provider, e.g. the manager of the assets,
such as an insurance or asset management company, is chosen by the employer. Economies can benefit
from personal pension plans as the long term individual saving rate increases, capital markets develop,
investments in productive capital are boosted and corporate performance is subject to more monitoring
(The World Bank, 1994). Governments can encourage investments in personal pension plans by creating
a non-inflationary economic environment, an adequate regulatory framework that fosters confidence in
the financial sector, by increasing financial literacy and also, by giving tax incentives to pension plan
investors.
The subject of this thesis are personal pension plans as this is the pillar that is voluntary and con-
tributions to it are based on free will, individuals therefore, actively decide if they want to participate
in it or not, contrary to the first pillar, which is mandatory. However, pension funds are not as closely
monitored as opposed to mutual funds, which makes data on them scarcer and might lead to governance
problems among others. However, the regulator has realized the severe negative impacts that the missing
data can have and EIOPA is working on a European Union wide survey to increase the transparency
of personal pension funds. Additionally, pension funds are a hot topic given the recent efforts of the
European Commission to regulate the personal pension market (more).
Lower income classes most likely are not able to save a substantial portion of their income, therefore,
personal pension funds and the return on capital is not very relevant for them. Financial knowledge
is often interconnected with wealth – high wealth and income cohorts are able to assess the needed
risk level and diversify their investment portfolio towards an optimal portfolio better. On the contrary,
middle income cohorts might not have the knowledge and their wealth is not big enough to benefit from
financial consultation and advisory services at financial institutions. So they end up with lower returns
on average than their wealthier counterparts and the wealth gap and pension gap increase further. In
this sense the third pillar reproduces existing inequalities whereas the first pillar aims to reduce them
(Foster, 2014). If personal pension funds are able to achieve a “good” return on average, in the sense
that their performance is comparable to mutual funds and ensures substantial capital growth over time,
they might have a positive effect on the wealth and pension gap. However, there are other externalities,
such as the social risk of a disease or death, that are not taken into account here.
It is also interesting to look at the pension gap from a gender perspective as it “can be understood
as the sum of gender inequalities over a lifetime, including differences in the life course (motherhood
penalty), segregated labour market and gendered social norms and stereotypes more generally” (EIGE,
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2015).
Personal pension plans in theory have the ability to serve as a corridor to enable a large number of
individuals access to financial markets without requiring a high level of financial literacy and thereby,
have the power to distribute capital income more equally. Based on the high importance of personal of
personal pension plans in the light of the unknown future of the first pillar, EIOPA has proposed the
development of an EU Single Market for personal pension products. Starting from the assumption of the
implementation of such a europe wide personal pension product, I conduct the necessary risk levels based
on the Synthetic Risk and Reward Indicator, which is widely adopted in the financial market industry of
pension savings and broadly used by the regulator also for mutual funds to ensure capital preservation
until retirement.
For this thesis I adopt EIOPA’s definition (EIOPA, 2014, 12f.) of personal pension products (PPP),
which is based on the below characteristics:
• Individual membership (independent of employers)
• Payment of contributions to an individual account
• Explicit retirement objective
• Early withdrawals of accumulated capital are limited or penalized
• Providers are private entities
• Personal pension funds are funded
• Restrictions may apply as to use of accumulated capital
Personal pension products gain importance as most countries are facing pension gaps and funding
deficits. Stress tests conducted by EIOPA in 2017 show that most European countries exhibit a substantial
funding gap in their pension systems which can lead to spillovers to the real economy (EIOPA, 2018).
The size of investments in personal pension products varies between European countries, a possible
explanation are structural differences in social systems between countries (OECD, 2016). However, there
is a common trend that shows that personal pension plans become more and more important and that the
European Union is encouraging its citizens to invest in personal pension products not only by developing a
standardized Pan European Personal Pension Product and thereby, transferring the social responsibility
of states towards individuals.
3.1 The Regulatory Environment
Since the recent economic crisis, central banks have started regulating financial markets more. In the
European Union, the European Central Bank is the main authority that poses directives on its member
states, which are then translated into national law, based on the specifications of each country to match
the requirements of domestic markets. The regulation of pension funds and the pension systems is still
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a national mandate but the European Commission is trying to change this and proposed first regulatory
measures to harmonize the national regulatory environment for personal pension plans.
Regulation is generally needed to counterfeit three different types of risks: systematic market, systemic
and agency risk. Supporters of free markets often point to possible negative effects of regulation, such
as a suboptimal asset allocation and a possible herding effect among investment managers. Pension
funds are different from banks as they have a long term perspective, systematic market risks evolve
because current generations can not trade with future generations, thereby, making intergenerational risk
sharing impossible. Systemic risk arises based on asymmetric information and the possibility of bank
runs and finally agency risk occurs as trading often happens between parties with different (asymmetric)
information and especially pension funds are prone to moral hazard and adverse selection. Pension
fund managers’ salaries are often based on short term goals and performances (relative to inadequate
benchmarks) thereby, encouraging managers to focus on short term gains instead of ensuring substantial
capital gains that can be realized when his or her investors retire (Srinivas, Whitehouse and Yermo,
2000).
Personal pension products can be defined as defined contribution (DC), defined benefit (DB) and
hybrid products; DC clearly dominate the European market with almost 80% (EIOPA, 2016, 85f.).
Despite the remarkable size and importance of the private pension fund sector the available data on
it is very scarce. According to the OECD (2016) the size of personal pension funds as a percentage
of a country’s GDP is variable and is between 0.3% in Portugal and 44.4% in Denmark in 2016. This
discrepancy is based on the differences in the institutional set up of pension systems between countries.
EIOPA has established that personal pension funds accounted for e1,089 billion by the end of 2014 in
the EU and are spread over 67 million consumers (EIOPA, 2016, 7)6. The Netherlands, the UK and
Belgium account for 77% of total assets in the EU which can be explained through differences in pension
savings culture and the maturity of the third pillar in the country (EIOPA, 2016, 82f.). Regardless of the
differences one can observe that the total number of assets and their percentage to the GDP are growing
across the European Union. The increase can be explained by higher investments in private pension plans
or positive rates of return or both (OECD, 2016).
The European Commission is currently in the process of implementing regulatory measures on pension
funds in order to counterfeit the mentioned market failures, such as a suboptimal asset allocation or
herding effects, and ensure a stable financial system. One of the main aims of it is to improve reporting
requests, increase the available data and thereby ensure transparency. In addition, switching between
personal pension plans also across country borders should be facilitated as more and more people work
and life in different countries of the European Union during their lifetime (ECB, n.d.).
In order to increase transparency of personal pension plans for their investors, the European Com-
mission voted to build a Capital Markets Union within its member states. The union contains also a new
European Central Bank regulation for pension funds.
6This data exclude Germany as it has not provided data to EIOPA. In addition, Cyprus, Greece and Liechtenstein have
indicated that there are currently no personal pension products available in their markets and Finland, Slovenia and Sweden
have not participated in the survey.
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“The objective of the new regulation is to improve the quality of the data reported by pension
funds. [...] The idea behind the regulation is to help plug a data gap that makes it difficult
to achieve a comprehensive understanding of cash flows and risks associated with pension
obligations. More data would increase transparency on pension funds’ activities, making it
easier to verify whether they are delivering on their promises. [...] Once this regulation enters
into force pension funds will report a larger set of data, with a higher level of harmonisation
and transparency, resulting in a stronger information base for policy decision-making.” (ECB,
n.d.)
Another goal of the new regulation is to harmonize the pension system between European member
states as the labor market is becoming more and more globalized and the European Commission believes
that economies of scale can be increased. EIOPA’s goal is to establish a Pan-European Personal Pension
Product (PEPP) that will be characterized by standard information provision, limited investment choices
and the definition of one default investment option, regulated, flexible, biometric and financial guarantees,
regulated, flexible caps on costs and charges, regulated, flexible switching and transfer of funds and no
specification of de-cumulation options (EIOPA, 2016, 5).
The structure of the national pension systems is dependent on the regulatory environment. Follow-
ing, the third pillar is also dependent on the institutional structure of the member states (Cristea and
Thalassinos, 2016). Although the EU is enforcing a strong regulatory set of prudential rules for many
financial institutions, personal pension plan providers remained vastly regulated on national level and do
not fall under a common European directive. On a national level we can differentiate between regulations
that limit pension funds to a minimum investment in governments bonds or capital projects or limit
the maximum exposure of pension funds to certain assets classes with high volatilities. Most European
countries have quantitative limits for each asset class, which differs based on the investment vehicle.
The Portuguese government, for instance, imposes that closed and open pension funds can invest up to
100% in equities and real estate, bank deposits and loans, whereas, personal retirement savings schemes
financed through pension funds are limited to 55% exposure in equities and 20% in real estate, bank
deposits and loans (OECD, 2017a).
3.2 The Performance of Personal Pension Funds
The assessment of the performance of European personal pension funds is a not well developed topic
in academia due to the lack of data and it is understood that pension funds differ from mutual funds
and have to be assessed in a different way, specifically with a much larger time horizon. The evaluation
of personal pension funds is also challenging because of differences in legal frameworks and valuation
methodologies between the member states of the European Union. Despite this, there is still a number of
studies that discuss the performance of the funds. Below I will provide a brief overview of some findings.
According to de Dreu and Bikker (2017), Dutch pension funds are not sophisticated investors. The
authors base this finding on three factors: they round their asset allocations to 5% tranches, investments
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in alternative, complex asset classes are rare and the presence of a significant home bias. All these factor
lead to limitations in risk diversification.
Studies that have been conducted in the past for specific countries show little or no evidence of added
value through active investment management, such as an actively managed fund. Given the high cost
structure, passive investment strategies, such as exchange traded funds, are often a better alternative.
The investment returns of pension funds do not outperform their respective benchmarks in most cases
and therefore most investors would be better off investing in passive strategies as the costs and fees
associated with these investment vehicles tend to be much lower.
The simple average of the real investment return for occupational and personal pension plans in 18
European Union countries in 2016 was 3.6% (net of investment expenses), ranging from 8.3% in Poland
to -1.2% in the Czech Republic (OECD, 2017b).
Antolin (2008) compares pension fund returns to benchmarks that have been build on the basis of the
Sharpe Ratio. The conclusion can be summarized as: “[...] pension funds have generally underperformed
with respect to the hypothetical portfolio with the highest (mean) return for a given level of risk”. The
main results are displayed in table 3.1.

























10.0 0.056 11.3 0.067 -1.3




13.9 0.070 12.0 0.070 1.9
United Kingdom 1985-2004 10.1 0.135 11.9 0.146 -1.8
As one can see, the results are mostly negative even without subtracting the annual fees for private
pension funds. Only Polish and Czech pension funds show a positive return relative to an optimized
portfolio.
Gregory and Tonks (2006) evaluate the performance of personal pension funds in the UK between 1980
and 2000 against different types of benchmarks, such as a single factor CAPM, a Fama-French 3-factor
model and a 4 factor benchmark model allowing for differences in market timing and conditioning the
performance on macroeconomic variables. The authors find “that average performance is not significantly
different from zero [which] is consistent with much of previous literature, that on average managed funds
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do not earn abnormal returns.” (Gregory and Tonks, 2006, 19)
Petraki and Zalewska (2017) not only study the performance of pension funds but also assess the
adequacy of pension funds’ primary prospectus benchmarks and conclude that the benchmarks chosen
are often not adequate and that although pension funds have outperformed their benchmarks in the
UK between 1980 and 2009 this changes rapidly when comparing the performance to other benchmarks,
which are not defined in the funds’ prospectus. The differences arise because funds often are allowed to
invest in other asset classes then their primary prospectus benchmark and therefore, the optimal asset
allocation of the benchmark and fund might differ in a significant manner.
Another study on the UK market between 1986 and 1994 shows that “[m]ost funds would have been
better off with their strategic allocation placed in passive index funds”. Thereby, questioning the added
value of active asset management strategies (Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann, 1999, 460).
Lithuania has a mandatory second pension pillar, data between 2011 and 2015 suggests that only the
most profitable funds reach slightly higher yields than the benchmark with significantly lower volatility
over the period but the majority of funds has underperformed their benchmark (Kabašinskas, Šutienė,
Kopa and Valakevičius, 2017).
Outside of the European Union pension funds also do not seem to overperform passive investment
strategies as shown by Gökçen and Yalçın (2015). Even before subtracting fees for active investment
strategies the authors conclude that Turkish pension funds failed to provide abnormal returns between
2004 and 2011. By performing a style analysis and separating investment decisions in style and selection
investment returns in their sample are explained by default and risk premia and the returns do not differ
from benchmark returns significantly (before costs).
Based on the above mentioned literature, one can conclude that on average personal pension funds
do not outperform their benchmarks and that index funds or benchmarks, can therefore be seen as an
optimistic proxy for private pension fund performance.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for mutual funds. The literature also suggest that cost efficient
alternatives such as exchange traded funds or index funds are on average a better investment option.
Although risk adjust returns are often similar between these three investment options, actively managed
funds display lower real returns when deducting management fees from the performance. For example,
Pace, Hili and Grima (2016) find that actively managed mutual funds offer the same risk adjusted return as
index funds but the fee structure is different, therefore, most investors would be better off when choosing
the cost efficient alternatives, such as index funds. Also, Afonso and Martins Cardoso (2017) find that
there is no significant difference between exchange traded funds, index funds and actively managed equity
mutual funds regarding outperformance and underperformance of their respective benchmark.
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4 Methodology and Data
Because of the challenging data situation, I was not able to conduct a performance analysis of European
personal pension funds. So, I decided to take a back-of-the-envelope approach and change my original
research question, also taking into account the up coming EIOPA regulation. As I have mentioned the
proposal for the regulation of personal pension products recommends a limited number of investment
options and a default option. Until now it is unclear what the default option will be. Based on the
assumption that a majority of investors will not deviate from the default option, this is a very important
factor and will have a significant impact on future returns and losses of investors in the Pan European
Personal Pension Product. Instead of assessing only the performance, I examine which volatility level an
investor has to choose on average to preserve the value of his or her investments.
I measure volatility with the SRRI, which groups funds into seven categories depending on their
volatility, so the upturn and downturn risk. It was tailored to provide investors with a harmonized
risk and reward indication, ensure an appropriate diversification of investment units across different
asset classes, be applicable to all investment funds and cost-efficient in its implementation among other
objectives. Hence, the SRRI should be included in every Key Information Document (KID).
SRRIs are based on the weekly volatility of the fund’s past returns, which is rescaled to a yearly basis
in a second step (if these are not available monthly returns shall be used). The sample period should
cover at least 5 years of a fund and should take possible dividends into account.





(rf,t − r̄f )2 (4.1)
rf,t represents the returns of a fund measured over T non overlapping periods of the duration of 1/m
years. Assuming the ideal scenario of weekly returns, m = 52 and T = 260 and r̄f is the arithmetic mean
of the returns over the T periods.






Table 4.1 presents the risk classification of funds into seven categories, which is also used by the
European Union, their minimum and maximum volatility bound and examples of financial assets, which
typically fall under this risk category (Meteor Research Department, n.d.).
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Table 4.1: Synthetic Risk and Reward Classification




Value preservation aimed with the goal
to earn a reasonable return. Main
investments: Euro money market funds,
deposits, Life insurance products, Fixed
income funds with an excellent rating.
2 0.5 2
3 2 5
Low 4 5 10
Value preservation paired with goal to
earn a higher return than cash offers.
Main investments: Equities, Equity
funds, ETFs with solid European and
Asian standard values.
Medium 5 10 15
Balanced investments between low and
high risk exposures. Main investments:
OTC equities, equities from third coun-
try parties, currency bonds with mid-
dle ratings and high yield government
bonds.
High 6 15 25
Aiming for high returns and acceptance
of high value swings. Main investments:
Options, Option certificates, Futures,
Junk bonds and Dividend funds.
Very High 7 25
Full acceptance of high downturn risk
and major value swings in the pursuit
of enhanced returns. Main investments:
Hedge funds, Funds from third party
countries and sector funds.
4.1 Benchmarking
Before I move on to the data description, I want to clarify the meaning of a benchmark since it is a
crucial concept in financial theory and also in this thesis.
A benchmark should be broad, neutral, investable and representative. However, it can be challenging
(or even impossible) to fulfil all of these criteria at once. One can differentiate between four types of
benchmarks: objective-driven, granular, broad and strategic. Of these four only a strategic benchmark
is able to meet all the quality criteria mentioned above (Blackrock Portfolio Solutions, n.d.).
An objective-driven benchmark is not asset-class specific but focuses on a goal, which can be the
return. In the light of pension fund investments, a benchmark of the fund’s costs plus inflation should
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be the minimum return requirement in order to ensure that investors are able to preserve the present
value of their savings. However, such a benchmark does not provide any information on the efficiency in
reaching the pre-defined goal. This type of benchmark can be enhanced by adding a risk parameter (for
example, the Sharpe Ratio).
A granular benchmark is driven by the current asset allocation and the product mix, which enables
the isolation of incremental risk and return from product selection versus allocation. Therefore, this type
is suitable for educated investors who base their investment decisions on a fixed detailed asset allocation
strategy and can not be used as a neutral, unbiased measure of risk. The mentioned weaknesses can be
overcome if the type is paired with a broad benchmark.
A broad benchmark represents all investable assets worldwide but is generally split according to asset
class and weighted based on the asset allocation of the fund that is compared to the benchmark. Biases
or cautious decisions to deviate from the variety of asset classes can cause a lack of representativeness,
which can be overcome by using a broad and granular benchmark.
A strategic benchmark can be seen as a refined version of a broad, long term neutral allocation.
Tactical changes will not necessary appear in a strategic benchmark, hereby, the efficiency of active tilts
is measured as opposed to a buy and hold investment strategy. Therefore, a strategic benchmark measures
success relative to long-term neutral positioning. (Blackrock Portfolio Solutions, n.d.)
The most common benchmark in academia is the risk free rate, as it represents a risk-free investment
strategy. Following, the number one goal of each investment, is to provide a higher return than the
applicable risk-free rate. Nowadays, different indices are often used as benchmarks as well, such as the
Eurostoxx 50 or S&P 500 for the US market. It makes sense to measure the performance of a large cap
European equity pension fund against the Eurostoxx 50 but will be completely useless for an Emerging
market bond fund. Therefore, investors must not only look at the relative performance compared to the
primary prospectus benchmark but also assess the meaningfulness of these figures.
The number of index funds is increasing, as investors are looking for cost efficient alternatives given
the low interest rates environment, also, they are becoming more and more important as benchmarks
because of their increasing variety. They serve as granular benchmarks as a fund strategy can be easily
compared to an exchange traded fund with a similar asset allocation. And also, represent a real investment
alternative as opposed to a strategic benchmark for instance. If an investor does not want to invest in
individual assets, he or she will not be able to replicate a strategic benchmark in his or her investments.
For defined benefit pension plans, a objective-driven benchmark would be more appropriate.
4.2 Data description
As already mentioned, finding data on the performance of pension funds is highly difficult, therefore, I
decided to use proxies instead. In the section on the theoretical context I establish that pension funds
on average do not outperform their benchmark and, even if they outperform, their superiority should be
questioned as the primary prospectus benchmarks of pension funds often are limited to investments in
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certain asset classes which can have a negative effect on the performance of the benchmark. As a result,
funds might seem to outperform restrictive benchmarks. In addition, there is a trend in the literature to
compare not only pension funds but also mutual funds to exchange traded funds, as these are highly cost
efficient alternatives to actively managed funds.
The combination of these two arguments has led me to the idea to use exchange traded funds as
an optimistic proxy for the performance of pension funds as the data availability of this relatively new
form of investment is much better and enables an analysis of returns. I decided to use all exchange
traded funds that are listed through Euronext, which is a pan European exchange, seated in Amsterdam,
Brussels, London, Lisbon, Dublin and Paris and is especially known for the listing of exchange traded
funds. I have found 727 funds in total and based on the methodology established for the SRRI I have
limited the number of funds to 266 based on the availability of weekly returns for these on Bloomberg.
For verification purposes, I also use the scarce data on the Portuguese personal pension funds. From 83
open private pension funds reported by the ASF, I only found data for 3 of them that has a sufficient
time frame to conduct the SRRI.
The dataset contains weekly price data for 5 years, ranging from the 30th of June 2013 to 30th of
June 2018. I calculated the returns on a weekly basis by using
pt
pt−1
− 1. Where pt is the current price
and pt−1 the price of the previous period of the funds. The returns I used are not adjusted for inflation
and also do not take the cost structure into account as they are based on the weekly price change of each
fund solely.
Based on the results of this computation I was able to assess the SRRI according to the methodology
I described previously. As expected, none of the exchange traded funds belong to the 1st, 6th and 7th
risk category and a vast majority belongs to the 4th, which is also described as a risk class for risk aware
investors. In addition, I end up with 2 funds for category 2, 35 funds for category 3 and 1 funds for
category 5 as can be seen in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Euronext ETFs split based on the SRRI
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5 Empirical Results
The research question of this thesis concerns the risk appetite of investors, in particular, I test how risk
loving an investor has to be in orderto preserve the purchasing power of his or her investment value
until retirement as this is the minimum goal that should be achieved through investments in financial
markets. In order to guarantee a sufficient rate or return it is not enough to have the same nominal
amount after a certain period of time in an account. Money looses purchasing power due to inflation (in
healthy economies). So, the value growth of the investment must at least equal the inflation rate. In
addition, investors in pension funds must take management fees into account. In this sense the absolute
performance often is not sufficient to evaluate the performance of funds, instead one must evaluate the
relative performance.
The time frame of the exchange traded funds data is limited to 5 years, starting in June 2013. On
one hand the shorter the period, the more funds can be included as a large number does not offer old
enough data and on the other hand 5 years are compliant with the requirement of the Synthetic Risk and
Reward Indicator. Financial crushes such as the one from 07/08 or the dot com bubble are therefore not
included in this analysis but one has to keep in mind that investors have been still facing turbulent times
on the financial markets in the time frame of this analysis.
Table 5.1 summarizes the first results. In the first year exchange traded funds have achieved a return
of 12.5% on average throughout all SRRI risk classes, in the second the return was 1.1%, in the third
period 29%, in the fourth a negative return of 1.1% and finally in the fifth year positive 1.4%. The five
year average of the analyzed funds shows 8.6%, which is highly influenced by the third year as the return
was almost 30% in that period.
Table 5.1: Average yearly returns of exchange traded funds
SRRI Cat No. of funds
Year
5Y Avr per cat
1 2 3 4 5
2 2 0.56% 1.93% 2.57% -1.04% -0.95% 0.61%
3 35 3.33% 2.78% 10.30% -0.76% -0.44% 3.04%
4 228 12.70% 13.49% 5.41% 15.16% 5.70% 10.4930%
5 1 33.31% -13.97% 97.57% -17.86% 1.24% 20.06%
Avr p.a. 12.47% 1.05% 28.96% -1.12% 1.39% 8.55%
As stated already, the inflation and the management costs for actively managed funds have to be
taken into account as well. The table 5.2 shows the Harmonized Inflation Consumer Price Index (HICP)
in the Euro zone for the period of my study. The average is also based on weekly inflation data, as the
returns of the funds. For the management fees I assume 2.5% per year, these include annual management
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fees and transaction fees. Gaining more data on personal pension funds will also increase the visibility
on fee structures, as aggregate data is scarce on this topic.







Combining these figures gives the average return of exchange traded funds subtracted by inflation and
the assumed fee proxy as can presented in table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Average yearly returns of exchange traded funds - inflation - proxy for management fees
SRRI Cat No. of Funds
Year
5Y Avr per cat
1 2 3 4 5
2 2 -2.84% -0.67% 0.03% -4.61% -4.96% -2.61%
3 35 -0.08% 0.19% 7.76% -4.34% -4.45% -0.18%
4 228 9.30% 10.90% 2.87% 11.59% 1.69% 7.27%
5 1 29.91% -16.56% 95.02% -21.43% -2.76% 16.83%
Avr p.a. 9.07% -1.54% 26.42% -4.70% -2.62% 5.33%
The results indicate that funds categorized as less risky, display negative relative returns in most
years, the only positive year for funds of category 2 is the third year. Category 4 is able to provide a 5
year average return of 7.3%, which is already very good and is able to ensure substantial capital growth
for investors. Category 5 is volatile with returns ranging from 95% in the third year, which was the best
for almost all funds to -16.6% in the second year. However, one has to keep in mind that the averaged
data is dependent on the number of observations, the more observations we have the smoother the results,
with a smaller amount of outliners.
In order to verify the results I obtained through my proxies, I use examples from the Portuguese
personal pension fund market. The ASF reports 83 open private pension funds listed in Portugal. I
was able to find the Bloomberg tickers or ISINs for 35 of these funds and retrieve the performance data
for only 3 of the funds for a sufficient time period. After using the same inflation and deducting 2.5%
as a fee proxy, I come to the conclusion that the fund, which is categorized as 4 has an average return
of 7.36% per year, which is in line with the results for my proxies of 6.75%. The other two funds are
of category 3, and show returns of -0.61% and 1.85% per year on average, as opposed to the exchange
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traded funds with -0.18%. These results are somehow in line with my previous estimation, especially if
we take into account that the average volatility of the third fund over the last 5 years is 4.32% which is
near the threshold to the next category. In addition, the categories are in line with my results as well. If
the only three funds that I was able to check would be of category 1, 6 or 7, this might indicate that the
exchange traded funds are not a good proxy at all for the performance of personal pension funds as the
fund structures differ in a significant manner.
Due to the low number of observations, the results in table 5.4 can not be seen as a full verification
of the analysis of the exchange traded funds but based on it one is also not able to reject my hypothesis
that the values should be closely related.
Table 5.4: The Performance of Selected Portuguese Personal Pension Funds
Year Variable BPIPORT PL Equity MCAPGRN PL Equity OPTCAAC PL Equity
1
Real Return 38.07% 5.08% 8.14%
Volatility 6.11% 2.24% 4.01%
2
Real Return -7.32% -2.54% 8.11%
Volatility 7.98% 2.86% 5.18%
3
Real Return -20.83% -2.06% -6.61%
Volatility 7.57% 2.57% 4.81%
4
Real Return 21.91% -0.33% 2.06%
Volatility 6.28% 1.75% 3.72%
5
Real Return 2.48% -3.21% -2.44%
Volatility 5.80% 1.87% 3.88%
5Y Avr real return 7.36% -0.11% 2.35%
5Y Avr Volatility 6.75% 2.26% 4.32%
Fund Category 4 3 3
Data from Bloomberg as of 23rd of August 2018
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this work is to provide an overview of the complexity of private pension funds in the European
Union, with a special focus on the Portuguese economy. Pension funds are a highly relevant financial
instrument and can have a huge impact on the financial well-being of many people, especially if they
belong to lower income cohorts.
The pension systems in many European economies seems to be at risk; substantial reforms are needed
and a clear regulatory framework. The future of the first pillar of the pension system is unclear and for
some population groups (e.g. women), the state pension is often not sufficient.
Following, the importance of the second and third pillar is growing. Aside from the consumption
smoothing component, the third pillar is able to encourage individuals to invest in financial markets and
therefore, distribute capital gains more equally. For this to happen, private pension funds have to provide
a return that is above the sum of inflation and their management fees. Investment theory states that the
longer the time horizon of an investment, the riskier an investment should be, so young people should
invest their retirement savings in more volatile financial assets than older people. However, investments in
private pension funds only make sense if the investment vehicles provide positive relative rates of return,
otherwise the purchasing power of investors is diminishing.
The European Commission has decided to impose strict regulations on financial markets and is aiming
to harmonize regulation between individual member states of the European Union, with the aim to
ensure macro prudential supervision and the stability of the financial markets. In addition, investors
and consumers should be protected. Furthermore the institution states, that pension systems have to
be regulated and personal pension plans should be also subject to financial regulation as mutual funds
are already within the European Union. The pension system should decrease inequality by providing
a minimum income to the people who are not able to work any more, but at the moment it seems
that differences between population groups are accelerated during retirement years as states often fail
to redistribute sufficiently. One of the reasons for the raising inequality in higher age groups are capital
gains throughout the lifetime of individuals through investments in capital markets. Personal pension
plans can help to minimize the difference or to secure an adequate income during retirement years for
more people when used adequately as they enable a broad mass of people to benefit from capital gains.
Reaching this goal is dependent on the governance of funds. The view of the European Union is that
investors have to be protected as other consumers too. Regulation declares that fees and costs must be
very transparent for investors.
The European Commission has called for the development of a Pan European Personal Pension
Product for all Eurozone countries. The proposal for the pension product contains the advise that a
default option should be established but it does not specify what the default option will be. One can
assume that a substantial portion of investors will stick to the default option, especially if they have a
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low level of financial literacy. Therefore, the decision on it is highly relevant. In addition, the European
Commission has to keep in mind that investors and their needs differ from each other. On one hand,
a person who will retire in 3 years should most likely not invest in highly volatile assets if he or she is
planning to liquidate the investments at the time or retirement.
Building on previous literature I assume that personal pension plans on average do not outperform
their benchmarks or low cost index funds, which are an important alternative for actively managed funds.
This allows me to use exchange traded funds that are listed at the Euronext. In the end I use 266 funds
for my analysis, as they provide enough data points for the synthetic risk and reward analysis. My results
show that investors at least should invest in funds of the risk category 4 to achieve positive returns. This
suggests, that the default option for the Pan European Personal Pension Product should be of category
4 or higher, thereby having a weekly volatility value between 5% and 10%.
For the assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the introduction of the Pan European
Personal Pension Product more specifications of the regulation are needed. Also, a comparison to other
personal pension products might remain challenging if the European Union will not require more data
from providers. Regardless of the difficulties a reform of the third pillar is needed and will benefit the
European population, even it will only lead to an increase of transparency. Furthermore, the financial
literacy among the population should be promoted to ensure that rational decisions are made. I assume
that the topic will gain further momentum in academia and eventually the data situation will improve,
enabling additional insights.
The future of pension systems is uncertain and only time will show if politicians will reform the
state pensions in a way that makes them sustainable instead of increasing the indebtedness of economies.
Meanwhile, it alternative pension investments can decrease the risk of age poverty under the circumstance
that individuals earn sufficiently to be able to save in the first place. The savings and investments will be
monitored by the regulator more closely in the future and new investment vehicles will be put in place.
Pension systems remain a highly important research topic as they influence all individuals and have the
ability to redistribute income, which is one of the main ideas of a social economy. The main limitation
of this thesis is the lack of data, which will hopefully become available in the near future as EIOPA is
currently working on a database on personal pension funds. It would be interesting to do the same study
with real data and see if the results differ from the results described here.
Another limitation of the analysis is the part of the population that is affected by the third pillar.
There is a significant part of the population in Portugal and also all over the world that does not
earn enough money to satisfy their basic consumption needs or that lives below the poverty threshold.
Furthermore, there is another significant part of the population that is able to satisfy their basic needs but
is not able to save anything. Improvements in the third pillar as proposed by the European Commission
will not have an impact on the mentioned groups as they are not able to contribute to it at all. It remains
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A.1 The Worldbank’s Three Pillar System
Figure A.1: Overview of the Three Pillar Pension System
Visualisation by author based on The World Bank (1994)
37
Maria Ziolkowski The SRRI and Personal Pension Funds
A.2 The Dependency Ratio
Table A.1: Current and Projected Dependency Ratios in the European Union – Country Breakdown
Dependency
ratio
2007 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Belgium 58 58 65 76 83 87 90
Germany 62 62 64 76 85 88 91
Estonia 56 55 57 64 70 81 88
Ireland 28 28 30 35 41 50 63
Greece 57 56 59 70 86 99 102
Spain 38 37 39 47 61 75 77
France 55 58 64 73 78 79 80
Italy 67 65 66 76 90 94 95
Cyprus 30 32 40 51 59 73 86
Latvia 48 45 47 57 66 82 91
Lithuania 62 61 66 80 91 108 123
Luxembourg 43 43 51 68 85 97 103
Malta 43 50 58 61 63 69 80
The Netherlands 30 30 35 39 42 41 42
Austria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Portugal n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Slovenia 59 61 70 85 103 115 118
Slovakia 50 48 48 59 72 89 102
Finland 56 57 66 74 74 75 78
Data from the European Commission (EC, 2018)
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A.3 The Retirement Age in the EU
Table A.2: Real and Statutory Retirement Age in the European Union – Country and Gender Breakdown
Country
Exit Age 2007 Statutory retirement Age 2008
Total Men Women Men Women
Belgium 61.6 61.2 61.9 65 64
Germany 62 62.6 61.5 65 65
Estonia 62.5 n/a n/a 63 60.5
Ireland 64.1 63.5 64.7 66 66
Greece 61 61.6 60.5 65 60
Spain 62.1 61.8 62.4 65 65
France 59.4 59.5 59.4 60 60
Italy 60.4 61 59.8 65 60
Cyprus 63.5 n/a n/a 65 65
Latvia 63.3 n/a n/a 62 62
Lithuania 59.9 n/a n/a 62.5 60
Luxembourg n/a n/a n/a 65 65
Malta 58.5 n/a n/a 61 60
The Netherlands 63.9 64.2 63.6 65 65
Austria 60.9 62.9 59.4 65 60
Portugal 62.6 62.9 62.3 65 65
Slovenia 59.8 n/a n/a 63 61
Slovakia 58.7 59.7 59.8 62 55-59
Data from the European Commission (EC, 2018)
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A.4 The Pension Gender Gap
Table A.3: Gender Gap in Pensions on Average - Country Breakdown
2012
Country Gender gap Women monthly pensions Men monthly pensions
Belgium 31.00% 1209 1754
Germany 44.68% 1035 1871
Estonia 4.82% 316 332
Ireland 37.01% 1171 1859
Greece 25.29% 712 953
Spain 33.78% 831 1255
France 35.89% 1263 1970
Italy 32.53% 1126 1669
Cyprus 37.05% 897 1425
Latvia 16.72% 254 305
Lithuania 11.44% 240 271
Luxembourg 45.06% 2207 4017
Malta 17.61% 627 761
The Netherlands 41.78% 1356 2329
Austria 38.75% 1530 2498
Portugal 31.14% 606 880
Slovenia 24.38% 673 890
Slovakia 7.58% 390 422
Finland 26.66% 1356 1849
Average EU27 38.30% 939 1522
Data from the European Commission (EC, 2018)
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A.5 Open Private Pension Funds in Portugal
Table A.4: Open Pension Funds in Portugal and Data Availability (1)
Ticker Full name Start date Data available
N/A Aberto - Zurich Vida Empresas 30/12/1997 No
FPBBVMC Aberto BBVA Multiativo Conservador 31/05/2005 No
MIXCONS Aberto BBVA Multiativo Moderado 02/09/2014 No
FPAPMES Aberto BBVA PME’S 29/06/1993 No
FPPRT20 Aberto BBVA Protecção 2020 31/05/2005 No
BPIPORT Aberto BPI Acções 30/09/2005 Yes
FPABGAR Aberto BPI Garantia 30/09/2005 Yes, not sufficient
FPABSEG Aberto BPI Segurança 09/06/1992 Yes, not sufficient
FPABVAL Aberto BPI Valorização 22/02/1993 Yes, not sufficient
N/A Aberto CA Reforma Garantida 28/12/2012 No
N/A Aberto CA Reforma Mais 15/11/2006 No
N/A Aberto CA Reforma Segura 21/10/2009 No
N/A Aberto CA Reforma Tranquila 21/11/2006 No
OPTCAAC Aberto Caixa PPR Rendimento Mais 10/07/2017 Yes, not sufficient
FPCRACT Aberto Caixa Reforma Activa 13/12/2001 No
FPCRG22 Aberto Caixa Reforma Garantida 2022 19/02/2007 No
FPCXRPR Aberto Caixa Reforma Prudente 15/07/2008 No
FPCXARV Aberto Caixa Reforma Valor 02/12/2005 No
N/A Aberto Corporate Crescimento 22/12/2017 No
N/A Aberto Corporate Dinâmico 20/09/2017 No
N/A Aberto Corporate Moderado 22/12/2016 No
N/A Aberto Eurovida Reforma Rendimento 19/07/2010 No
N/A Aberto Eurovida Reforma Valor 19/07/2010 No
N/A Aberto FUTURO ACTIVO 24/03/2010 No
FPFTRCL Aberto Futuro Clássico 25/02/1999 No
FPFTLIF Aberto Futuro Life 19/12/2000 No
FPFTRPL Aberto FUTURO PLUS 18/06/2014 No
FPFTXXI Aberto Futuro XXI 14/07/2009 No
FPHZNAC Aberto Horizonte Ações 26/02/1992 No
FPHZNSG Aberto Horizonte Segurança 24/06/1996 No
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Table A.5: Open Pension Funds in Portugal and Data Availability (2)
Ticker Full name Start date Data available
FPHZVLR Aberto Horizonte Valorização 08/10/1993 No
N/A Aberto Open 19/11/2004 No
N/A Aberto Poupança Reforma PPR - BNU/Vanguarda 02/11/1990 No
N/A Aberto PPR Europa 27/10/1997 No
N/A Aberto PPR MDS Equiĺıbrio 22/12/2017 No
N/A Aberto PPR Praemium - S 13/12/1989 No
N/A Aberto PPR Praemium V Ações 13/12/1989 No
N/A Aberto Real Previdência Empresas, FP 29/06/1993 No
N/A Aberto Reforma Empresa 05/11/1996 No
N/A Aberto Reforma Mais 28/12/2001 No
N/A Aberto Rendimento Activo 26/07/2000 No
FPSGFEE Aberto SGF Empresas Equilibrado 27/12/1994 No
FPEMPRD Aberto SGF Empresas Prudente 07/10/2005 No
FPEACDN Aberto SGF Empresas Stoik Ações 10/11/2015 No
FPSGFSA Aberto SGF Square Ações 31/08/2013 No
N/A Aberto Turismo - Pensões 27/10/1997 No
N/A Aberto Vanguarda PPR 29/01/1996 No
N/A Aberto Victoria Multireforma 03/10/2007 No
N/A Aberto VIVA 13/04/1992 No
PTFP00000192 BBVA Dinâmico PPR Ações 12/11/2009 No
PTFP00000085 BBVA Equilibrado PPR 29/07/1992 No
PTFP00000077 BBVA Prudente PPR 11/11/2002 No
BPIVPPR BPI Vida - PPR 27/08/1996 Yes, not sufficient
N/A Fundo de Poupança Reforma PPR Geração Activa 01/07/2008 No
N/A
Fundo Poupança Reforma PPR BIG ACÇÕES AL-
PHA
02/10/2013 No
N/A Fundo Poupança Reforma PPR BIG TAXA PLUS 13/09/2013 No
N/A GES 16/08/1993 No
ESMLTRF Multireforma 16/08/1993 Yes, not sufficient
ESMLTAC Multireforma Ações 10/09/2008 Yes, not sufficient
MCAPGRN Multireforma Capital Garantido 11/05/2009 Yes
N/A Multireforma Plus 15/11/2005 No
N/A NB PPA 09/05/1997 No
N/A Optimize Capital Pensões Acções 29/12/2010 No
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Table A.6: Open Pension Funds in Portugal and Data Availability (3)
Ticker Full name Start date Data available
N/A Optimize Capital Pensões Equilibrado 22/11/2010 No
N/A Optimize Capital Pensões Moderado 29/12/2010 No
N/A Poupança Reforma CVI - PPR 24/08/1993 No
N/A PPA Acção Futuro 11/10/1995 No
FPPRFAC PPR - Património Reforma Acções 23/04/2004 No
FPREFCN PPR - Património Reforma Conservador 06/12/2002 No
FPPREQL PPR - Património Reforma Equilibrado 06/12/2002 No
FPREFPR PPR - Património Reforma Prudente 26/05/2000 No
N/A PPR 5 Estrelas 23/11/1989 No
N/A PPR BIG Ações Equilibrado 22/01/2018 No
N/A PPR BIG Conservador 30/01/2018 No
N/A PPR BIG Moderado 22/01/2018 No
N/A PPR BIG Obrigações Estatégico 06/03/2018 No
N/A PPR Garantia de Futuro 05/12/1996 No
N/A PPR Platinium 29/12/1997 No
N/A PPR SGF Acções Dinâmico 18/09/2009 No
N/A PPR SGF Garantido 12/12/2008 No
N/A PPR SGF STOIK AÇÕES 15/02/2016 No
N/A PPR Vintage 30/10/1995 No
N/A Real Reforma Activa 31/12/2008 No
N/A Real Reforma Garantida 29/12/2010 No
N/A Real Reforma Jovem 31/12/2008 No
N/A Real Reforma Senior 31/12/2008 No
N/A Victoria Valor Vantagem - Duplo Valor PPR 04/12/1989 No
Data from Bloomberg as of 28th of August 2018
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A.6 Exchange Traded Funds listed at Euronext
Table A.7: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (1)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
LU1681039480 EPRE LN Equity AMUNDI FTSE EPRA EUR RL EST
LU1681046931 C40 FP Equity AMUNDI CAC 40 UCITS ETF
FR0010754200 C3M FP Equity AMUNDI ETF CASH 3 MONTHS EUR
FR0010655712 CG1 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF DAX UCITS ETF DR
FR0010900076 ESM LN Equity AMUNDI ETF EURO STOXX SMALL
LU1681043755 CE9 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EE XR-EUR
LU1681044563 AASU LN Equity AMUNDI MSCI EM ASIA UCITS
LU1681044480 AASI FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EM ASIA UCITS ET
LU1681045024 ALAT FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EM LATIN AME ETF
LU1681047236 C50 FP Equity AMUNDI EURO STOXX 50 ETF DR
LU1681047319 CD5 FP Equity AMUNDI EURO STOXX 50
FR0010688176 CB5 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE BANKS
FR0010688184 CD6 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE CONSU
LU1681042435 CG9 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EUROPE GROWTH
LU1681041973 CD9 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI ERP HI DIV-C
FR0010688192 CH5 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE HEALT
FR0010688218 AIND LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE INDUS
FR0010688168 CS5 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE CONSU
FR0010688234 CU5 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE UTILI
LU1681042518 CV9 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI ERP VALUE FACTOR
LU1681044308 CS9 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EUROPE EX SW ETF
LU1681043326 AEXK LN Equity AMUNDI MSCI EUROPE EX UK UCI
LU1681039647 CC4 FP Equity AMUNDI EURO CORPORATES-C
FR0010791137 C8M LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE MATER
FR0010713735 CT5 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE TELEC
LU1681046774 X1G FP Equity AMUNDI GOVT BOND LOWEST
LU1681041205 AGEB FP Equity AMUNDI GBL EM BONDS IBOX ETF
LU1681046261 CB3 FP Equity AMUNDI GOVT BOND EUROMTS
FR0010755611 CL2 FP Equity AMUNDI ETF LEVERAGED MSCI US
LU1681037518 FMI FP Equity AMUNDI FTSE MIB UCITS ETF
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Table A.8: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (2)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
LU1681043912 CC1 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI CHINA UCITS
FR0010930644 ANRJ LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI EUROPE ENERG
LU1602144575 CMU LN Equity AMUNDI MSCI EMU UCITS DR ETF
LU1681043086 CI2 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI INDIA UCITS
FR0010655720 CI1 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI ITALY UCITS
LU1681044647 CN1 LN Equity AMUNDI MSCI NORDIC UCITS
FR0010655746 CS1 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI SPAIN UCITS
LU1681044720 CSW FP Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI SWITZERLAND
LU1681045370 AEEM FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EMERG MARK
LU1681044217 0SEC LN Equity AMUNDI INDEX SOLUTIONS - MSC
FR0010655761 CUK LN Equity AMUNDI ETF MSCI UK UCITS ETF
LU1681042864 CU2 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI USA-EUR
LU1681043599 CW8 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI WORLD UCITS-EUR
LU1681038243 ANX FP Equity AMUNDI NASDAQ 100-EUR
FR0010717124 C4S FP Equity AMUNDI ETF SHORT CAC 40 DAIL
FR0010791194 C2U FP Equity AMUNDI ETF SHORT MSCI USA DA
FR0010823385 S10 LN Equity AMUNDI ETF SHORT GOVT BOND E
LU1681048804 500 FP Equity AMUNDI S&P 500 UCITS ETF
LU1681049018 500U LN Equity AMUNDI S&P 500 UCITS ETF
LU1681040223 C6E FP Equity AMUNDI STOXX EUROPE 600
LU1681040652 US7 FP Equity AMUNDI US TREASURY 7-10 ETF
LU1681040819 US1 FP Equity AMUNDI US TREASURY 1-3 ETF
LU1681045537 CE8 FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI WORLD EX EUR
LU1681045883 CWF FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI WRLD FIN S
LU1681046006 CWE FP Equity AMUNDI INDEX SOLUTIONS - MSC
LU1681041627 MIVO LN Equity AMUNDI MSCI ERP MIN VOLAT
LU1437025023 C1U FP Equity AMUNDI ETF FTSE 100 UCITS ET
LU1437024992 BRZ LN Equity AMUNDI MSCI BRAZIL
LU1681041890 QCEU FP Equity AMUNDI MSCI EURP QLT FCT ETF
LU1602144732 CJ1 FP Equity AMUNDI INDEX SOLUTIONS - AMU
LU1681038599 NDXH FP Equity AMUNDI NAS-100 EUR HE
LU1602145036 CP9U LN Equity AMUNDI INDEX SOLUTIONS - AMU
LU1681049109 500H FP Equity AMUNDI S&P 500 UCITS ETF
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Table A.9: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (3)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
LU1681037864 TPXH FP Equity AMUNDI JAPTPIX EUR H
LU1681047079 C4D FP Equity AMUNDI CAC 40 UCITS
FR0010018333 SYA FP Equity BNPPEASY AUTO UCITS ETF-CAP
FR0007068051 SYM FP Equity BNPPEASY MEDIA UCITS ETF-CAP
FR0007068085 SYE FP Equity BNPPEASY OIL GAS UCITS ETF
FR0007068069 SYQ FP Equity BNPPEASY TECH UCITS ETF-CAP
FR0007068044 SYT FP Equity BNPPEASY TELECOMM UCITS ETF
FR0007068036 SYU FP Equity BNPPEASY UTILITIES UCITS ETF
LU0378434079 CBSX5T GR Equity COMSTAGE ETF DJ EUR STO 50-I
LU0635178014 E127 GR Equity COMSTAGE ETF MSCI EMR MKTS
LU0392494562 CBNDDUWI GR Equity COMSTAGE ETF MSCI WORLD-I
LU0444605306 PP2 PL Equity COMSTAGE ETF PSI 20 LEVERAGE
LU0488316133 C012 GR Equity COMSTAGE ETF S&P 500
DE000A0H0728 DJCOMEX GR Equity ISH DIV COMDTY SWAP DE
IE00B4K6B022 H50E LN Equity HSBC EURO STOXX 50 UCITS ETF
IE00B42TW061 HUKX LN Equity HSBC FTSE 100 UCITS ETF
IE00B5W34K94 HMBR LN Equity HSBC MSCI BRAZIL UCITS ETF
IE00B51B7Z02 HCAN LN Equity HSBC MSCI CANADA UCITS ETF
IE00B44T3H88 HMCH LN Equity HSBC MSCI CHINA UCITS ETF
IE00B5LP3W10 HMFD LN Equity HSBC MSCI EM FAR EAST UCITS
IE00B4TS3815 HMLD LN Equity HSBC MSCI EM LATIN AMERICA U
IE00B5BD5K76 HMEU LN Equity HSBC MSCI EUROPE UCITS ETF
IE00B5SG8Z57 HMXJ LN Equity HSBC MSCI PACIFIC EX JAPAN U
IE00B57S5Q22 HZAR LN Equity HSBC MSCI SOUTH AFRICA CAPD
IE00B5BRQB73 HTRD LN Equity HSBC MSCI TURKEY UCITS ETF
IE00B5WFQ436 HMUS LN Equity HSBC MSCI USA UCITS ETF
IE00B4X9L533 HMWD LN Equity HSBC MSCI WORLD UCITS ETF
IE00B5VX7566 HMJP LN Equity HSBC MSCI JAPAN UCITS ETF
IE00B5KQNG97 HSPX LN Equity HSBC S&P 500 UCITS ETF
IE00B7LGZ558 IFRB LN Equity ISHARES FRANCE GOVT BND
IE00B6X2VY59 IRCP LN Equity ISHARES EURO CORP BND IR-H
IE00B0M62Y33 IAEX LN Equity ISHARES AEX
IE00B14X4T88 IAPD LN Equity ISHARES ASIA PAC DIVIDEND
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Table A.10: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (4)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
IE00B3DKXQ41 IEAG LN Equity ISHARES EURO AGGREGATE
IE00B3F81R35 IEAC LN Equity ISHARES CORE EURO CORP BOND
IE00B3FH7618 IBGE LN Equity ISHARES EURO GOVT 0-1YR
IE00B0M63516 IBZL LN Equity ISHARES MSCI BRAZIL
IE00B1W57M07 BRIC LN Equity ISHARES BRIC 50
IE00B02KXK85 FXC LN Equity ISHARES CHINA LARGE CAP
IE00B52VJ196 IESE LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EUROPE SRI
IE00B57X3V84 IGSU LN Equity ISHARES GLOBAL SUST SCREENED
IE0032523478 IBCX LN Equity ISHARES EURO CORP LARGE CAP
IE00B3B8Q275 ICOV LN Equity ISHARES EURO COVERED BOND
IE00B14X4Q57 IBGS LN Equity ISHARES EUR GOVT 1-3YR
IE00B1FZS913 IBGL LN Equity ISHARES EURO GOVT 15-30YR
IE00B1FZS681 IBGX LN Equity ISHARES EURO GOVT 3-5Y
IE00B1FZS806 IBGM LN Equity ISHARES EURO GOVT 7-10YR
IE00B0M62X26 IBCI LN Equity ISHARES EURO INFL-LKD GOVT
IE00B0M63730 IFFF LN Equity ISHR MSCI AC FAR EAST X-JP
IE00B0M63953 IEER LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EAST EUROPE CPD
IE00B4WXJH41 IEGZ LN Equity ISHARES EURO GOVT 10-15YR
IE00B4WXJG34 IEGY LN Equity ISHARES EURO GOVT 5-7YR
IE00B0M63177 IEEM LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EM
IE00B0M62S72 IDVY LN Equity ISHARES EURO DIVIDEND
IE00B0M62V02 IDJG LN Equity ISHR EUR TTL MKT GRWTH LARGE
IE00B02KXL92 DJMC LN Equity ISHARES EURO STOXX MID CAP
IE00B02KXM00 DJSC LN Equity ISHARES EURO STOXX SMALL CAP
IE00B0M62T89 IDJV LN Equity ISHR EUR TTL MKT VAL LARGE
IE0008471009 EUE LN Equity ISHARES EURO STOXX 50
IE00B14X4N27 IEUX LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EUROPE EX-UK
IE00B1YZSC51 IMEU LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EUROPE
IE0005042456 ISF LN Equity ISHARES CORE FTSE 100
IE00B4WXJJ64 IEGA LN Equity ISHARES CORE EURO GOVT BOND
IE00B1FZS467 INFR LN Equity ISHARES GLBL INFRASTRUCTURE
IE00B02KXH56 IJPN LN Equity ISHARES MSCI JAPAN
IE00B0M63391 IKOR LN Equity ISHARES MSCI KOREA
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Table A.11: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (5)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
IE00B27YCK28 LTAM LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EM LATAM
IE00B4L5YC18 SEMA LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EM ACC
IE00B4K48X80 SMEA LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EUROPE ACC
IE00B4L5YX21 SJPA LN Equity ISHARES CORE MSCI JAPAN
IE00B4L5Y983 SWDA LN Equity ISHARES CORE MSCI WORLD
IE00B14X4M10 INAA LN Equity ISHARES MSCI NORTH AMERICA
IE00B1TXHL60 IPRV LN Equity ISHARES LISTED PRIVATE EQY
IE00B1FZS244 IASP LN Equity ISHARES ASIA PROPERTY YIELD
IE00B0M63284 IPRP LN Equity ISHARES EUROPE PRPRTY YIELD
IE00B1FZS350 IWDP LN Equity ISHARES DVL MKT PROPERTY YLD
IE00B1FZSF77 IUSP LN Equity ISHARES US PROPERTY YIELD
IE0031442068 IUSA LN Equity ISHARES S&P 500
IE0008470928 EUN LN Equity ISHARES STOXX EUROPE 50
IE00B0M63623 ITWN LN Equity ISHARES MSCI TAIWAN
IE00B1FZS574 ITKY LN Equity ISHARES MSCI TURKEY
IE00B14X4S71 IBTS LN Equity ISHARES USD TRSRY 1-3Y USD D
IE00B1FZS798 IBTM LN Equity ISHARES USD TREASURY 7-10Y
IE00B1FZSC47 ITPS LN Equity ISHARES USD TIPS
IE0032895942 LQDE LN Equity ISHARES USD CORP BOND USD D
IE00B0M62Q58 IWRD LN Equity ISHARES MSCI WORLD
IE00B3VWN393 CBU7 LN Equity ISHARES USD TREASURY 3-7YR
IE00B52SF786 CSCA LN Equity ISHARES MSCI CANADA ACC
IE00B3VTML14 CBE7 LN Equity ISHARES EUR GOVT 3-7Y ACC
IE00B53QDK08 CSJP LN Equity ISHARES MSCI JAPAN ACC
IE00B5WHFQ43 CMXC LN Equity ISHARES MSCI MEX CAPPED USD
IE00B53QG562 IEMU LN Equity ISHARES MSCI EMU EUR ACC
IE00B52SFT06 CSUS LN Equity ISHARES MSCI USA USD ACC
IE00B53SZB19 CNX1 LN Equity ISHARES NASDAQ 100 USD ACC
IE00B52MJY50 CPXJ LN Equity ISHARES CORE MSCI PACIF X-JP
IE00B5V87390 CSRU LN Equity ISHARES MSCI RUSSIA ADR/GDR
IE00B5BMR087 CSPX LN Equity ISHARES CORE S&P 500
IE00B23LNQ02 PSRW LN Equity INVESCO FTSE RAFI ALL WORLD
IE00B23D9240 PSWC LN Equity INVESCO DYNAMIC US MARKET
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Table A.12: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (6)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
IE0032077012 EQQQ LN Equity INVESCO NASDAQ-100 DIST
IE00B23D8Y98 PSES LN Equity INVESCO FT RAFI EURO MID-SML
IE00B23D9570 PSRM LN Equity INVESCO FTSE RAFI EMERGING
IE00B23D8X81 PSRE LN Equity INVESCO FTSE RAFI EUROPE
IE00B23D8S39 PSRF LN Equity INVESCO FTSE RAFI US 1000
IE00B3YCGJ38 SPXS LN Equity INVESCO S&P 500 ACC
IE00B3CNHG25 AUCO LN Equity L&G GOLD MINING UCITS ETF
IE00B4WPHX27 COMF LN Equity L&G LONG DATED ALL COMMOD
IE00B3CNHJ55 RTWO LN Equity L&G RUSSELL 2000 US SMALL CP
LU1407893301 GILI LN Equity LYXOR CORE FTSE UK INF GILTS
LU0854423687 GLDM FP Equity LYXOR MSCI ACWI GOLD-C-EUR
LU1407892592 GILS LN Equity LYXOR CORE FTSE ACT UK GILTS
FR0000021842 BEL BB Equity LYXOR BEL 20 TR DR UCITS ETF
FR0010975771 YIEL LN Equity LYXOR BOFAML EUR HY EX FINC
FR0011023639 BTPL FP Equity LYXOR BTP DAILY 2X LEVERAGED
FR0010411884 BX4 FP Equity LYXOR CAC40 DX2SHRT
FR0010346205 CRNO LN Equity LYXOR TR CORE COMMO EX-EGR
FR0007056841 DJEL LN Equity LYXOR DJ INDUSTRIAL AVERAG
FR0010481127 ECB FP Equity LYXOR EURMTS COV BOND AGG
FR0010204073 CECL LN Equity LYXOR EASTERN EUROPE
FR0010833566 MUA FP Equity LYXOR FTSE EPRA/NA US EUR
FR0010204081 ASIL LN Equity LYXOR CHINA ENTREPRISE
FR0010361675 0MR7 LN Equity LYXOR HONG KONG HSI-DIST
FR0010967323 LEMB LN Equity LYXOR IBOXX LQD EMERG SVRG
FR0010961003 US10 LN Equity LYXOR IBOXX TRSUR 10Y+ DR
FR0010408799 RIOU LN Equity LYXOR BRAZIL IPOVESPA
FR0010410266 LTMU LN Equity LYXOR MSCI EM LAT AM-C-EUR
FR0010592014 LVC FP Equity LYXOR CAC 40 DAILY 2X LEV
LU0854423687 GLDM FP Equity LYXOR MSCI ACWI GOLD-C-EUR
LU0533033238 HLTW IM Equity LYXOR MSCI WORLD HEALTHCARE
LU0533033667 TNOW IM Equity LYXOR MSCI WORLD IT
FR0010296061 USAU LN Equity LYXOR MSCI USA-D-EUR
FR0010315770 WLDD LN Equity LYXOR MSCI WORLD
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Table A.13: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (7)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
LU0533034129 TELEW IM Equity LYXOR MSCI WORLD TELECOM
FR0010342592 LQQ FP Equity LYXOR NASDAQ 100 DALY LEV
FR0010326140 RUS FP Equity LYXOR DOW JONES RUSSIA
FR0010591362 SHC FP Equity LYXOR CAC 40 DAILY -1X INVER
FR0010464446 AFSL LN Equity LYXOR S-AFR FTSE JSE TOP40
FR0010378604 SEL FP Equity LYXOR STX600 SELCT DIV 30
FR0010424143 BXX FP Equity LYXOR EURSTX 50 D -2X INVERS
FR0010344879 HLT FP Equity LYXOR EURSTX600 HALTHCARE
FR0010345389 BRE FP Equity LYXOR STX600 BASIC RSRCES
FR0010344838 TRV FP Equity LYXOR EURSTX600 TRVL&LEISR
FR0011067529 THA FP Equity LYXOR THAILAND SET50 NET TR
FR0010245514 JPNL LN Equity LYXOR JAPAN TOPIX D-EUR
FR0011363423 USAC FP Equity LYXOR MSCI USA-C-EUR
LU0832435464 LVO NA Equity LYXOR S&P500 VIX FTURES ER
FR0010527275 WATL LN Equity LYXOR WORLD WATER
LU1287023003 MTC FP Equity LYXOR EURMTS 5-7Y INVG DR
LU1287023185 MTD FP Equity LYXOR EURMTS 7-10Y INVG DR
LU1650492173 L100 LN Equity LYXOR FTSE 100-C-GBP
LU1287022708 PAF FP Equity LYXOR PAN AFRICA
LU0832435464 LVO NA Equity LYXOR S&P500 VIX FTURES ER
LU1407887162 US13 LN Equity LYXOR IBOXX TRSR 1-3Y
LU1407888996 US57 LN Equity LYXOR CORE IBOXX TRSR 5-7Y
IE00B42Z5J44 IJPE LN Equity ISHARES MSCI JPN MONTH EUR-H
IE00B441G979 IWDE LN Equity ISHARES MSCI WORLD EUR-H
LU0459113907 ETFW20L PW Equity LYXOR WIG 20
LU0599613147 S6EW LN Equity OSSIAM STOXX EUROPE 600 EQUA
LU0599612842 EUMV LN Equity OSSIAM ETF EUROPE MIN VAR
LU0599612412 USMV LN Equity OSSIAM ETF US MINIMUM VARIAN
IE00B3ZW0K18 IUSE LN Equity ISHARES S&P 500 EUR-H
I IE00B44Z5B48 ACWD LN Equity SPDR ACWI
IE00B3YLTY66 IMID LN Equity SPDR ACWI IMI
IE00B466KX20 EMAD LN Equity SPDR EM ASIA
IE00B4613386 EMDD LN Equity SPDR BBG BARC EM LOCAL BND
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Table A.14: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (8)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
IE00B469F816 EMRD LN Equity SPDR EMERGING MARKETS
IE00B6YX5M31 JNKE LN Equity SPDR BBG EURO HIGH YIELD
IE00B5M1WJ87 EUDV LN Equity SPDR EUR DIV ARISTOCRATS
IE00B910VR50 EMUE LN Equity SPDR MSCI EMU
IE00B4YBJ215 SPY4 LN Equity SPDR S&P 400 US MID CAP
IE00B6YX5C33 SPY5 LN Equity SPDR S&P 500
IE00B459R192 USAG LN Equity SPDR BBG US AGGREGATE
IE00B44CND37 TRSY LN Equity SPDR BBG US TREASURY
NL0009272749 TDT NA Equity THINK AEX UCITS ETF
NL0009272756 TMX NA Equity THINK AMX UCITS ETF
NL0009690221 TGET NA Equity THINK GLOBAL EQUITY UCITS ET
NL0009690247 TCBT NA Equity THINK IBOXX CORPORATE BOND U
NL0009272772 NTM NA Equity THINK TOTAL MARKET UCITS ETF
NL0009272780 TOF NA Equity THINK TOTAL MARKET UCITS ETF
NL0010408704 TSWE NA Equity THINK SUSTAINABLE
LU0629460089 UC46 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI USA SRI UCITS
LU0446734872 UB23 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI CANADA
LU0136234068 UB01 LN Equity UBS ETF EURO STOXX 50
LU0721553864 UB99 LN Equity UBS ETF MAR.IB.EUR LIQ. COR.
LU0480132876 UB32 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI EMERG. MARKETS
LU0147308422 UB06 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI EMU
LU0671493277 UB69 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI EMU SMALL CAP
LU0629460675 UB39 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI EMU SRI
LU0446734104 UB12 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI EUROPE
LU0136240974 UB02 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI JAPAN
LU0446734526 UB20 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI PACIFIC EX JPN
LU0629460832 UB45 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI PACIFIC SRI
LU0721552544 UB74 LN Equity UBS ETF BAR. CAP. US TR. 1-3
LU0721552973 UB82 LN Equity UBS ETF BAR. CA. US TR. 7-10
LU0629459743 UC44 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI WORLD SRI
IE00B7K93397 UC13 LN Equity UBS ETF S&P 500
IE00B77D4428 UC04 LN Equity UBS ETF MSCI USA DIS
IE00B9F5YL18 VDPX LN Equity VANGUARD FTSE ASIA PAC EX JP
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Table A.15: Euronext Exchange Traded Fund Names and Bloomberg Tickers (9)
ISIN Ticker Fund name
IE00B3RBWM25 VWRD LN Equity VANGUARD FTSE ALL-WORLD UCIT
IE00B3VVMM84 VDEM LN Equity VANGUARD FTSE EMERGING MARKE
IE00B945VV12 VEUR LN Equity VANGUARD FTSE DEVELOP EUROPE
IE00B8GKDB10 VHYD LN Equity VANGUARD FTSE ALL WRLD HI DV
IE00B95PGT31 VDJP LN Equity VANGUARD FTSE JAPAN UCITS
IE00B3XXRP09 VUSA LN Equity VANGUARD S&P 500 UCITS ETF
Data from Bloomberg as of 5th of August 2018
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